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ALASKA OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION V. PRITZKER : THE COURT
FORESEES A WARM FUTURE AND UPHOLDS
BEARDED SEALS’ ESA LISTING
I. INTRODUCTION
Climate change is any significant, long-lasting change in the
climate.1  Global warming, which is the rise in average surface tem-
peratures due to greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere,
is merely one aspect of climate change.2  Recent reports by the In-
tergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) all reveal the
primary cause of global warming to be anthropogenic, and the sci-
entific community largely agrees.3  Recent studies indicate most
Americans believe in climate change and support scaling back on
releasing carbon emissions.4  The impact of climate change is not
1. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-16-004, Climate Change Indicators in the
United States 3 (4th ed. 2016), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/pro
duction/files/2016-08/documents/climate_indicators_2016.pdf [hereinafter Cli-
mate Change Indicators] (defining climate change).
2. Id. (defining global warming).
3. See Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Chief Doubts Consensus View of Climate Change,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/
epa-scott-pruitt-global-warming.html?action=click&contentCollection=Politics&
module=RelatedCoverage&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=Article (discussing re-
cent report on global warming).  The IPCC’s 2013 report concluded it was “ex-
tremely likely that more than half [of] the global warming” between 1951 and
2010 came from human emissions, such as carbon dioxide; similarly, a January
2017 report by NASA and the NOAA stated “[t]he planet’s average surface temper-
ature has risen about 2.0 degrees Fahrenheit . . . driven largely by increased carbon
dioxide and other human-made emissions into the atmosphere.” Id. (stating con-
clusions of scientific reports).  According to Dr. Benjamin D. Santer, a climate re-
searcher with the Energy Department, decades-long research by the scientific
community proves that natural factors simply cannot be the cause of the current
state of global warming. Id. (discussing consensus among scientists).
4. See Nadja Popovich, John Schwartz & Tatiana Schlossberg, How Americans




sion=highlights&contentPlacement=9&pgtype=sectionfront (discussing results of
Yale study on Climate Change). Nationally, sixty-nine percent of adults support
restrictions on carbon emissions from coal power plants and seventy-five percent
support general restrictions on carbon emissions. See id. (demonstrating public
support for carbon regulation).
(309)
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limited to the environment, however, and is quite extensive.5  An
assessment published in April 2016 concluded that “[e]very Ameri-
can is vulnerable to the health impacts associated with climate
change.”6  Further, Arctic marine mammals, such as the bearded
seal, are particularly susceptible to the effects of global warming.7
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has classified Arctic
sea ice as a climate change indicator and according to a 2016 re-
port, Arctic sea ice is rapidly diminishing.8  In Alaska Oil & Gas Asso-
ciation v. Pritzker,9 these impacts led the Center for Biological
Diversity (CBD) to petition the National Marine Fisheries Services
(NMFS) for Endangered Species Act (ESA) protections for the
Alaskan seal.10
Despite these reports, climate change skeptics remain.11  For-
mer President Obama’s administration led global efforts to reverse
5. See Climate Change Indicators, supra note 1, at 5 (explaining importance of
climate change).
6. Id. (linking climate change with human health).  “Climate change can ex-
acerbate existing health threats or create new public health challenges through a
variety of pathways.” Id. at 54 (discussing impacts on human health).  Notably,
health impacts depend on several other factors, such as pre-existing health condi-
tions, poverty, and changes in ecosystems. See id. (acknowledging impact of non-
climate change variables on study of health risks).
7. See CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, Petition to List the Ringed, Bearded and
Spotted Seals as Threatened or Endangered Species 1 (May 28, 2008), http://www.bio
logicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/bearded_ringed_and_spotted_seals/pdfs/
CBD_ringed_bearded_spotted_petition.pdf [hereinafter Petition to List] (summa-
rizing global warming impacts); see also Climate Change Indicators, supra note 1, at 40
(providing facts about Arctic sea ice).  Global warming has caused rapid melting of
Arctic sea ice, making all “ice-associated pinnipeds” in Alaskan waters vulnerable.
Petition to List, supra (noting unique impact to Alaskan pinnipeds).
8. See Climate Change Indicators, supra note 1, at 40 (discussing Arctic sea ice
indicator).  The EPA compiled this list of thirty-seven indicators from data of gov-
ernment agencies, academic institutions, and other institutions to help the public
understand observations related to climate change and its consequences. Id. at 4
(providing background on report and climate indicators).  The Arctic sea ice “indi-
cator tracks the extent, age, and melt season of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean.” Id. at
40 (stating purpose of Arctic sea ice indicator).  According to the 2016 report, sea
ice extent reached an all-time low in September 2012 at forty-four percent below
the 1981-2010 average; September 2015, March 2015, and March 2016 also saw
record lows. Id. (summarizing tracking results).  Additional impacts of climate
change include ocean conditions and acidification; shipping, oil, and gas activities,
along with their associated risks; and increased exposure to existing threats. See
Petition to List, supra note 7, at 2 (listing climate change threats to bearded seal).
9. 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, No. 17-133, 2018 WL 491542, at *1
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2018).
10. See Petition to List, supra note 7, at ii-iii (summarizing petition to list Alas-
kan seals).
11. See Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker (Pritzker II), 840 F.3d 671, 679 (9th
Cir. 2016) (challenging agencies’ use of climate change models); see also Elizabeth
A. Lake & Rafe Petersen, Projecting the Future: Ninth Circuit Upholds ESA Listing for
Bearded Seals, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (ENVTL. LAW INST.) 10,217,
2
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the effects of climate change, but President Trump’s administration
has changed course.12  In June 2017, President Trump announced
the United States was withdrawing from The Paris Climate Agree-
ment and affirmed this plan in September.13  This reversal, along
with the administration’s focus on de-regulation, leaves uncertainty
regarding the future of environmental laws, including the ESA.14
This Note explores the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Pritzker.15  Part II discusses the facts of Pritzker and its
procedural history.16  The legal background of the issues in Pritzker,
including judicial standards of review and the ESA, are addressed in
Part III.17  Part IV discusses the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Pritzker
10,219, 47 ENVLRNA 10217 (Mar. 2017), (noting president’s “distrust” of sci-
ence); Davenport, supra note 3 (discussing EPA chief’s contradictory view of cli-
mate change science).
12. See THE WHITE HOUSE, The Record: President Obama on Climate and Energy 1,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files
/achievements/theRecord_climate_0.pdf (last visited Sept. 16, 2017) (summariz-
ing commitment to climate change); Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S.
from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html (discussing President’s
decision to withdraw from Paris Climate Agreement).  President Trump explained
the withdrawal was due to the Agreement’s imposition of “wildly unfair environ-
mental standards on American businesses and workers.”  Shear, supra (stating Pres-
ident’s reason for withdrawal).
13. See Emre Peker, White House Says It Reiterated its Stance on Paris Climate Deal,
WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2017, 8:12 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-
house-says-it-reiterated-its-stance-on-paris-climate-deal-1505755040 (clarifying
stance on Paris Agreement); see also Shear, supra note 12 (discussing President’s
decision to withdraw from Paris Climate Agreement).  The Paris Climate Agree-
ment, which was signed by 195 nations, “intended to bind the world community
into battling rising temperatures in concert.”  Shear, supra note 12 (stating goal of
Paris Climate Agreement).  Under the Agreement, the United States pledged to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 “and commit[ted] up to $3 billion in aid
for poorer countries by 2020.” See id. (summarizing United States’ commitment
under Agreement).  The withdrawal of “Earth’s second-largest polluter is a major
blow.” Id. (discussing impact of United States’ withdrawal).
14. See Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Act-
ing Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey H. Wood Delivers Remarks at the Texas En-
vironmental Superconference (Aug. 4, 2017), in JUSTICE NEWS, https://www.justice
.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-jeffrey-h-wood-delivers-remarks-
texas-environmental (explaining new approach to regulations); see also Lake & Pe-
tersen, supra note 11, at 10,219 (summarizing potential administrative and legisla-
tive challenges).  For a discussion on other potential changes, see infra notes 184-
188 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s holding, see infra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
16. For Pritzker fact summary, see infra notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion on the standards of review, see infra notes 48-72
and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the statutory requirements of the
ESA, see infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the applica-
tion of the ESA, see infra notes 82-123 and accompanying text.
3
Riley: Alaska Oil & Gas Association v. Pritzker: The Court Foresees a Wa
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2018
312 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX: p. 309
step-by-step.18  Part V analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in
Pritzker.19  Finally, Part VI concludes with a discussion of Pritzker’s
potential impacts.20
II. BREAKING THE ICE: THE FACTS OF PRITZKER
On May 28, 2008, CBD petitioned the Secretary of Commerce
to list three Alaskan seal species—including the Beringia Distinct
Population Segment (DPS)—as endangered or threatened under
the ESA.21  CBD sought protection for three seal species because, as
inhabitants of Alaskan waters, they are especially vulnerable to the
impacts of global warming.22  Finding the petition satisfied regula-
tory requirements, NMFS proceeded with conducting status
reviews.23
On December 10, 2010, NMFS published a proposed rule to
list two bearded seal distinct population segments (DPSs) as
threatened pursuant to the ESA.24  “Threatened species” are those
18. For a summary of the Ninth Circuit’s analysis, see infra notes 124-150 and
accompanying text.
19. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, see infra notes 151-178
and accompanying text.
20. For a further discussion on Pritzker’s future impacts, see infra notes 179-
193 and accompanying text.
21. See Petition to List, supra note 7, at ii (stating applicable law and petition’s
purpose).  CBD sought protection for ringed seals, bearded seals, and spotted
seals. Id. (introducing petition).
22. See id. at 1 (providing summary of petition).  Global warming causes sea
ice to melt rapidly, which “threatens all Arctic marine mammals with extinction.”
Id. (explaining threat of global warming).  With respect to these particular species,
global warming eliminates their sea ice habitat, reduces likelihood of successful
reproduction and pup survival, and impairs molting. See id. at 2 (explaining im-
pact of global warming on ringed, bearded, and spotted seals).
23. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Threatened and Not
Warranted Status for Subspecies and Distinct Population Segments of the Bearded
Seal, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,496, 77,496 (proposed Dec. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 223) [hereinafter Proposed Rule] (citing Petitions, 50 C.F.R.
§ 424.14(b)(2) (2016) (providing supplementary information for proposed rule)).
NMFS concluded CBD’s petition presented “substantial information” on the peti-
tioned action. See id. (providing background of proposal).  A Biological Review
Team (BRT) consisting of biologists and scientists conducted the status review us-
ing the “best scientific and commercial data available,” as required by the ESA. Id.
(discussing status review).  The BRT’s report was then independently peer re-
viewed by a group of scientists experienced “in bearded seal biology, Arctic sea ice,
climate change, and ocean acidification.” Id. at 77,496-97 (noting thoroughness of
studies).
24. See id. at 77,496 (summarizing published action).  There are two subspe-
cies of the bearded seal: “Erignathus barbatus nauticus and Erignathus barbatus
barbatus.” Id. (naming identified subspecies).  NMFS “conclude[d] that E. b.
nauticus consists of two distinct population segments (DPSs), the Beringia DPS and
the Okhotsk DPS.” Id. (explaining conclusion).  The proposed rule sought com-
ments and information on listing the species. Id. (soliciting additional informa-
4
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“species which [are] likely to become endangered within the fore-
seeable future.”25  In reaching its conclusion, NMFS adopted a new
“threat-specific” approach to determine the foreseeable future for a
species, under which impacts are assessed through the end of the
century.26  NMFS acknowledged that predictions through the end
of the century, particularly from 2050-2100, depended largely on
assumptions about future emissions and presented greater inherent
uncertainties than the estimates for the earlier part of the cen-
tury.27  To account for these uncertainties, NMFS independently
evaluated the performance of six models and only used those which
simulated conditions similar to the observed conditions.28  The Bio-
logical Review Team’s (BRT’s) status review revealed that sea ice,
while used by bearded seals year-round, is particularly important
tion).  Because the district court denied plaintiffs relief for the Okhotsk DPS, this
Note focuses on the Beringia DPS. See Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Pritzker (Pritzker
I), No. 4:13-cv-18-RRB, 2014 WL 3726121, at *4 (D. Alaska July 25, 2014) (denying
standing).
25. See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,497 (explaining ESA statutory
provisions).
26. See id. (addressing new “foreseeability” approach).  In NMFS’s 2008 status
review for the ribbon seal, threats to the seal were only analyzed through the year
2050, but under the new approach, the foreseeability determination is “case spe-
cific and depends upon both the foreseeability of threats to the species,” as well as
“the species’ response to those threats.” Id. (stating revised approach).  NMFS still
relied on the “best scientific and commercial data available,” assessing impacts
based on the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. Id. (discussing basis for findings).
For certain threats, including disease and parasitic outbreaks, the best scientific
data available did not cover through 2100, so the analysis was limited to the
timeframe covered by the available data. Id. (noting approach for threats with
limited data).
27. See id. at 77,503 (discussing limitations of new approach).  While predic-
tions through 2050 are based on emissions that have already occurred or will occur
in the near future, predictions through the year 2100 largely depend on assumed
emissions. See id. at 77,503 (discussing model projections).  Any uncertainties for
the timeframe through 2050 are the result of different methods of incorporating
physical processes, and can be addressed by incorporating the ranges of different
models. See id. (addressing limits of early century models).
28. See id. at 77,503-04 (summarizing model selection).  Although the six
models were previously deemed satisfactory under medium and high emissions
scenarios, the BRT conducted an independent evaluation “because habitat
changes are not uniform throughout the hemisphere.” Id. at 77,504 (discussing
independent evaluations).  NMFS used the models that met its performance crite-
ria to project sea ice impacts through 2100. See id. (explaining model selection).
Of the five different regions evaluated for the Beringia DPS, six of the models
reasonably agreed with observations for the Chukchi and east Siberian Seas re-
gions; four reasonably agreed with observations for the Beaufort and eastern Ber-
ing Seas regions; and one model was in reasonable agreement with observations
for the western Bering Sea region. See id. (summarizing results of independent
evaluation).
5
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during reproductive and molting seasons.29  Admitting that the
bearded seal population was difficult to assess due to the “remote-
ness and dynamic nature of their [habitat], time spent below the
surface and their broad distribution and seasonal movements,”
NMFS concluded the population was approximately 155,000.30
Then, based on these findings, NMFS discussed the factors im-
pacting the bearded seal’s future viability.31  After considering the
identified threats and impacts, and the inherent uncertainties of
the climate models, NMFS ultimately determined the Beringia DPS
was “likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future”
and proposed listing the species as threatened.32
On December 28, 2012, NMFS published its final rule listing
the Beringia DPS as threatened under the ESA.33  NMFS again ad-
29. See id. at 77,497-99 (summarizing key findings).  During reproduction, sea
ice protects bearded seal pups from predators, and during molting, it is used as a
platform for “accelerat[ing] shedding and regrowth of hair and epidermis.” Id. at
77,497-98 (detailing seasonal uses).  The seals’ habitat is further restricted to sea
ice over shallow waters due to the habitats of their primary food sources. See id. at
77,497, 77,499 (discussing food habits).
30. See Proposed Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 77,501-02 (discussing bearded seal pop-
ulation).  NMFS estimated the current population of the Beringia DPS to be ap-
proximately 155,000 based on data analysis of various aerial surveys. See id. at
77,502 (stating current population estimate).
31. See id. at 77,502 (applying law to findings).  Having focused its risk assess-
ment on the impacts to the bearded seal’s habitat, NMFS concluded the seal’s
primary threat was factor (A) of section (4)(a)(1). See id. (concluding viability
threated by factor (A)).  The agency’s primary concern was “the likelihood that
[the bearded seal’s] sea ice habitat ha[d] been modified by the warming climate,”
coupled with “the scientific consensus projections [ ] for continued and perhaps
accelerated warming in the foreseeable future.” Id. (providing specific basis for
conclusion).  These concerns led NMFS to conclude its assessment must focus on
“observed and projected changes in sea ice, ocean temperature, ocean pH (acid-
ity), and associated changes in bearded seal prey species” to be reliable. Id. (ex-
plaining basis for assessment).  NMFS determined that, in order to adapt to sea ice
loss, the Beringia DPS “would likely have to shift their nursing, rearing, and molt-
ing” activities to northern areas where food access was poor and there were “in-
creased risks of disturbance, predation, and competition.” Id. at 77,506
(summarizing impacts of threat).
32. Id. at 77,511-12 (proposing Beringia DPS listing).  NMFS found it highly
likely that sea ice reductions in the Beringia DPS’s range would occur; that there
was a moderate to high threat that reductions in seasonal sea ice could not only
impact molting and pup maturation, but also result in the separation of resting
areas from feeding habitat; and that there were moderate to high risks to the con-
tinued existence of Beringia DPS within the foreseeable future. See id. at 77,511
(stating conclusions).  Notably, there was agreement among all independent peer
reviewers regarding the necessity of sea ice during crucial life stages for the Ber-
ingia DPS’s continued existence. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d 671, 677 (9th Cir. 2016)
(noting agreement among peer reviewers).
33. See Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status for the Ber-
ingia & Okhotsk Distinct Population Segments of the Erignathus barbatus nauticus
Subspecies of the Bearded Seal, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,740, 76,740 (Dec. 28, 2012) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223) [hereinafter Final Rule] (listing Beringia DPS as
6
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dressed the new foreseeability approach and explained that the un-
certainties were accounted for in its assessment.34  Additionally,
NMFS conducted a special independent peer review prior to pub-
lishing the final rule to address disagreement among peer reviewers
and the ambiguities associated with climate change projections.35
After considering all identified threats, potential risks and impacts,
conservation efforts, and all uncertainties, NMFS again concluded
that the Beringia DPS was likely to become endangered and listed it
as threatened.36
Following the final rule’s publishing, various plaintiffs filed
lawsuits challenging the listing.37  The plaintiffs raised several
claims, including: (1) “the listing decision was not based on the
‘best scientific and commercial data available’” as required by the
ESA; (2) the bearded seal population was “plentiful;” (3) “a lack of
reliable population data made it impossible to determine an extinc-
tion threshold;” (4) the predictive models used were too specula-
threatened).  Although the proposed rule’s deadline for public comments and in-
formation was February 8, 2011, NMFS extended the deadline at the public’s re-
quest. See id. at 76,750 (explaining public comment period).  During the public
comment period, NMFS received over five thousand written comment submissions
and heard testimony from forty-one people. See id. (noting public response).
34. See id. at 76,741 (addressing limitations of new approach).  NMFS reaf-
firmed its belief that this approach allows for a “more robust analysis” and ex-
plained it was consistent with the Department of the Interior’s guidance. See id.
(noting confidence in new approach).
35. See id. at 76,750 (explaining steps taken to inform listing determination).
NMFS hired three scientists to conduct the special peer review based on their
“marine mammal expertise and specific knowledge of bearded seals.” Id. at
76,750-51 (discussing special peer review).  NMFS included in the final rule a sum-
mary of comments received during the notice period, as well as its responses to
these comments. See id. at 76,751-67 (addressing public and peer comments).  In a
response to one of these comments, NMFS explained a 2010 study indicated that
“sea ice loss has been reported” at faster rates than the predictive models expected.
See id. at 76,753 (acknowledging increased rate of sea ice loss).  One commenter
even raised concerns that impacts were underestimated because studies showing
climate change’s effects had been substantially greater than projected. See id. at
76,759 (responding to public comments).
36. See id. at 76,748 (summarizing listing determinations).  NMFS found it was
highly likely that sea ice reductions in the Beringia DPS’s range would occur within
the foreseeable future; there was a moderate to high threat that reductions in sea-
sonal sea ice would result in separation of resting areas from feeding habitat; there
was a moderate to high threat of reductions in sea ice for molting, and a moderate
threat of reductions in sea ice for pup maturation; and that there were moderate
to high risks to the continued existence of Beringia DPS within the foreseeable
future. See id. (stating conclusions).  In sum, access to sea ice in shallow waters was
crucial to the survival of the Beringia DPS, and without it, they would have to make
significant adjustments. See id. at 76,744 (summarizing impact of threats).
37. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d 671, 674-75 (9th Cir. 2016) (providing procedural
background).  The plaintiffs relevant to this case are Alaska Oil and Gas Associa-
tion (AOGA), the State of Alaska, and North Slope Borough. See id. (listing
plaintiffs).
7
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tive; (5) NMFS changed its approach to listing determinations
involving Arctic sea ice; and (6) NMFS failed to establish the nexus
between sea ice extent and the Beringia DPS’s survival.38  The
United States District Court for the District of Alaska concluded the
listing decision was “arbitrary and capricious” because NMFS relied
on volatile “long-term climate projections” and had insufficient
data on the bearded seal’s population trends.39  On July 25, 2014,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plain-
tiffs and vacated NMFS’s listing decision.40
NMFS and CBD appealed, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit heard arguments on August 4, 2016.41
The issue decided by the Ninth Circuit was “[w]hen NMFS deter-
mines that a species that is not presently endangered will lose its
habitat due to climate change by the end of the century, may NMFS
list that species as threatened under the Endangered Species
Act?”42  The Ninth Circuit upheld the Beringia DPS listing “[i]n
light of the robustness of NMFS’s rulemaking process, as well as
[the] highly deferential standard of review.”43  The court reversed
the district court’s judgment on October 24, 2016.44
III. UNDERSTANDING THE HABITAT: LEGAL BACKGROUND
OF PRITZKER
Although the plaintiffs in Pritzker challenged NMFS’s compli-
ance with the ESA statutory framework, the climate change contro-
versy was central to their complaint.45  Integral to the court’s
holding were the judicial standards of review under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) and established case law.46  The Ninth
38. See id. at 675 (stating plaintiffs’ claims).  The State of Alaska also chal-
lenged NMFS’s response to its public comments and claimed NMFS “failed to com-
ply with the ESA’s state cooperation provisions.” Id. (stating procedural claim).
The procedural claim is not addressed in this Note.
39. See id. (citing Pritzker I, 2014 WL 3726121, at *3-4) (explaining lower
court’s holding).  The district court also granted Alaska summary judgment on the
claim NMFS did not comply with the state cooperation provisions. See id. (granting
summary judgment on procedural claim).
40. See Pritzker I, 2014 WL 3726121, at *16 (ordering final rule be vacated).
The district court remanded the listing to NMFS to “correct the aforementioned
substantive and procedural deficiencies.” Id. (remanding for corrections).
41. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 675 (stating basis for Ninth Circuit proceeding).
42. Id. at 674 (stating issue presented).
43. Id. at 685 (summarizing findings).
44. See id. at 686 (reversing district court).
45. See id. at 679 (explaining plaintiffs’ true intentions).  For a further discus-
sion on climate change, see supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
46. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 685 (upholding final listing rule).
8
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Circuit also placed heavy emphasis on NMFS’s compliance with the
“letter and spirit of the ESA” framework.47
A. Standards of Review
Judicial standards of review for agency actions, including ESA
listing decisions, are governed by the APA.48  The APA instructs re-
viewing courts to set aside agency actions that are found to be “arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.”49  The Supreme Court provided guidance on
this standard in the landmark case Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Associ-
ation of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. (State Farm).50  The State Farm Court explained reviewing courts
are to determine whether the agency “articulate[d] a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made,’” but must not “supply a rea-
soned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not
given.”51  The Court also made it clear that the deferential and nar-
row “arbitrary and capricious” standard prohibits courts from “sub-
stitut[ing] its judgment for that of the agency.”52
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,53 the Court rejected the
courts of appeals’ interpretations of State Farm.54  The Second Cir-
47. See id. (concluding NMFS adhered to ESA requirements).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (setting forth reviewing court’s role in evaluating
agency actions); see also Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 550 (9th Cir.
2016) (citing In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d)
Rule Litig. (In re Polar Bear), 709 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (stating applicable
standard).
49. § 706(2)(A) (explaining appropriate circumstances for setting aside
agency actions).
50. 463 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1983) (considering “arbitrary and capricious” stan-
dard of review).
51. Id. at 43 (first quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962); and then quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947)) (explaining scope of review).   So long as the “agency’s path may reasona-
bly be discerned,” the agency’s decision should be upheld. Id. at 43 (quoting Bow-
man Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974))
(noting circumstances in which agency decisions should be upheld).
52. Id. (describing scope of review under arbitrary and capricious standard).
Under this standard, an agency’s decision may be arbitrary or capricious
if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. (giving examples of arbitrary and capricious actions).
53. 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
54. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009) (rejecting
“heightened standard” for policy changes).
9
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cuit, along with the D.C. Circuit, had interpreted State Farm as re-
quiring a heightened standard for changes in agency policy.55  The
Court explained an agency may not change a policy without expla-
nation, or “simply disregard” those policies on the books, but it is
sufficient “that the new policy is permissible under the statute,
[and] that there are good reasons for it.”56
Courts also afford agencies deference in interpreting and ad-
ministering statutes.57  The Supreme Court first provided this defer-
ence in Skidmore v. Swift & Co..58  In holding that agency decisions
and interpretations constitute a “body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for gui-
dance,” the Skidmore Court noted the weight afforded these deci-
sions varied with the circumstances.59
Forty years later, in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,60 the Supreme Court established a two-prong test for deter-
mining when agency interpretations should be given controlling
weight.61  The Chevron Court explained reviewing courts must first
55. See id. at 514 (explaining courts of appeals’ interpretations).  The Second
Circuit had interpreted State Farm as requiring agencies to precisely explain why
the new policy was better than the old and what had changed since the original
policy; the D.C. Circuit required a similar heightened review for changes in agency
policy. Id. (noting flawed interpretations of appellate courts).
56. Id. at 515-16 (explaining required showing).  The Court explained the
APA statute did not distinguish between initial agency actions and subsequent
changes. See id. (rejecting understanding of appellate courts).  While State Farm
did hold that agencies must explain changes in policy, it generally does not re-
quire a heightened standard. See id. (clarifying State Farm holding).  Heightened
standards apply when an agency’s policy contradicts the prior policy, but that is
due to the new policy’s undermining the old—not the change itself. See id. (not-
ing basis for heightened standard).  The Court ultimately upheld the FCC’s policy
without affording any additional deference under either Chevron or Skidmore. See
id. at 530 (reversing Second Circuit).
57. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001) (discussing
deference afforded agency interpretations).
58. 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (discussing influence of administrative
interpretations).
59. Id. at 139-40 (holding administrative documents influential in judicial de-
cision making).  In conducting its analysis, the Court pointed out that administra-
tive decisions have no legal basis and are not based in fact, nor are they binding on
the judiciary. See id. (considering value of agency interpretations).  Nevertheless,
the Court recognized an administrator’s policies “are made in pursuance of official
duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and in-
formation,” in order to provide guidance in enforcing laws. Id. at 139-40 (acknowl-
edging special circumstances of agency policies).  The weight afforded to these
documents should be based on their thoroughness, validity, consistency, and any
other factors “which give it power to persuade.” Id. (stating factors for
consideration).
60. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. See id. at 842-44 (explaining two-part test for determining appropriate
deference).
10
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determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to” or is silent on
the issue.62  Where Congress is silent, the reviewing court must de-
termine whether the agency’s interpretation is “a permissible con-
struction of the statute.”63  So long as the agency’s interpretation is
not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute,” it
should be accepted by the court.64
In United States v. Mead Corp.,65 the Court further clarified
when a statute is entitled to Chevron deference.66  In Mead Corp., the
Court held Chevron deference is appropriate where the interpreta-
tion “was promulgated in the exercise of” the agency’s general
rulemaking authority.67  Although the classification ruling at issue
in Mead Corp. did not qualify for Chevron deference, the Court ex-
plained this conclusion did not “place [it] outside the pale of any
deference whatever,” as Skidmore deference may be due.68  The
Court did not decide whether Skidmore deference was owed, but did
provide guidance on the circumstances considered in determining
a “fair measure of deference” and the “spectrum of judicial re-
62. Id. at 842-43 (stating first step).  Where Congress has precisely expressed
its intent, it must be given full effect. Id. (directing courts to respect Congress’s
intent).
63. See id. at 843 (explaining impact of first determination).  The court recog-
nized an agency’s power in administering programs “necessarily requires the for-
mulation of policy and the making of rules” to fill gaps. Id. (acknowledging rule-
making power of agencies).
64. See id. at 843-44 (considering agency authority).  The Court explained that
gaps left by Congress are “an express delegation of authority to the agency to eluci-
date a specific provision . . . by regulation.” Id. (recognizing delegation of
authority).
65. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
66. Id. at 226 (stating reason for granting certiorari).
67. Id. at 226-27 (clarifying when statutes qualify for Chevron deference).  Del-
egation is demonstrated by the agency’s power to adjudicate, create “notice-and-
comment rulemaking,” or any other comparable indication of congressional in-
tent. Id. (providing examples of delegation).
68. See id. at 234 (concluding Chevron deference not applicable).  In issuing
classification rulings, Customs does not employ a “notice-and-comment” practice,
nor is the ruling given broad general effect; rather, these rulings are “conclusive
only as between [Customs] and the importer to whom it was issued.” Id. at 233
(noting limited effect of Customs rulings).  Further, as nothing in the statute indi-
cates Congress intended for these classifications to be treated as “rulemaking with
force of law,” the Court concluded that “classification rulings are best treated like
‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines.’” Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587
(2000)) (rejecting applicability of Chevron).  The Court made clear Chevron did not
overrule Skidmore, and that these types of interpretations may still qualify for defer-
ence due to agencies’ “specialized experience and broader investigations and in-
formation.” Id. (rejecting dissent’s argument).
11
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sponses.”69  Seven years later, in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki,70
the Court considered what “measure of respect” an agency’s inter-
pretation is entitled to under Skidmore.71  The Court deferred to the
agency interpretation at issue in Holowecki, emphasizing that it had
been binding on agency staff for at least five years and allowed the
agency to fulfill its enforcement duties.72
B. The Endangered Species Act
Congress enacted the Federal ESA in 1973, seeking to “reverse
the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”73  The ESA
protects species that are “in danger of extinction,” as well as those
“likely to become . . . endangered . . . within the foreseeable fu-
69. See id. at 227-28, 238-39 (discussing Skidmore).  The Court stated courts
should consider “the degree of the agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and
relative expertness, and . . . the persuasiveness of the agency’s position” when mak-
ing this determination. Id. at 228, 238-39 (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
at 139-40) (footnotes omitted) (listing weight considerations).  Judicial responses
vary from “great respect . . . to near indifference.” Id. (first citing Aluminum Co.
of America v. Central Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 389-90 (1984); and
then citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1988)) (ex-
plaining weight spectrum).
70. 552 U.S. 389 (2008).
71. See id. at 399 (applying Skidmore).  The interpretation, which was in the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC’s) compliance manual and
internal memoranda, interpreted both the regulations and statute at issue. See id.
(considering interpretation at issue).  The statements did not qualify for Chevron
deference, but did constitute “a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.” Id. (quoting Brag-
don v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)) (first citing Alaska Dept. of Envtl. Conser-
vation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-88 (2004); and then citing Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at
227-39) (distinguishing from Chevron).
72. See id. at 399-401 (first citing Mead Corp, 533 U.S. at 228; and then citing
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993)) (analyzing degree of
deference due).  The Court acknowledged the interpretation had been inconsis-
tently enforced over the five-year period, but explained “undoubted deficiencies in
the agency’s administration . . . are not enough . . . to deprive the agency of all
judicial deference.” Id. at 399-400 (considering weight of interpretation).  Finding
the plaintiff’s interpretation did not allow the EEOC to fulfill its enforcement du-
ties, the Court deemed the agency’s interpretation binding. See id. at 401-02 (de-
ferring to agency).
73. Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 2016) (quot-
ing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978)) (explaining Con-
gress’s intent in enacting ESA); accord 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012) (stating ESA’s
purpose).  The Act initially only included those species threatened by “worldwide
extinction,” but the 1973 version extended “protection for species in danger of
extinction throughout ‘a significant portion of its range.’”  Def. of Wildlife v. Nor-
ton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing ESA’s legislative history).  The
Ninth Circuit explained this language was added “in order to encourage greater
cooperation between federal and state agencies,” and to provide the Secretary
greater flexibility in managing wildlife. Id. (discussing purpose of amended
statute).
12
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ture.”74  To qualify for the ESA’s protections, a species must be
identified and listed as “threatened” or “endangered” by either the
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS).75  Listings may be triggered either by independent
agency initiative or upon receipt of a petition from an interested
party.76  Within one year of finding the petitioned action war-
ranted, the agency must publish a proposed rule, with a final rule
published within one year of the proposed rule.77
Section 4 of the ESA sets forth the process for making listing
determinations.78  Pursuant to this section, NMFS must conclude
that one of five factors makes the species likely to become endan-
gered within the foreseeable future before listing it as threatened.79
These five factors are: “(A) the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutiliza-
tion for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational pur-
poses; (C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing
regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (2012) (defining “endangered species” and
“threatened species”).  Species means “any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants,
and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife
which interbreeds when mature.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (defining “species”).
75. See generally § 1533 (2012) (setting forth process for determining endan-
gered and threatened species); see also Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining listing process).  The Act
delegated authority to the Secretaries of Commerce and the Interior, who later
authorized FWS and NMFS to administer the statute. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15)
(defining “secretary”); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2017) (delegating authority to FWS
and NMFS).
76. See Nw. Ecosystem All., 475 F.3d at 1137 (explaining ESA listing process).
The Service may list on its own initiative through “notice-and-comment rule-mak-
ing,” or in response to a petition by “[a]ny interested person.” Id. (first citing 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5); then citing 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2012); and then citing 16
U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A)) (explaining listing process).  If petitioned, the receiving
agency must “promptly determine whether the petition is supported by ‘substantial
scientific or commercial information.’” Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A))
(explaining petition process).
77. See id. at 1137-38 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(B)) (explain-
ing process upon finding petition warranted); 50 C.F.R. § 424.17 (2017) (discuss-
ing time limits and required actions).  The proposed rule must describe the
proposed action, summarize the supporting data, and establish the relationship
between the data and proposed action. 50 C.F.R. § 424.16 (2017) (providing pro-
cedures for proposing rules).  Alternatively, the agency may withdraw the pro-
posed rule or publish a notice of extension. See 50 C.F.R. § 424.17 (discussing
alternatives).
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (providing rules for determining endangered and
threatened species).
79. See id. §§ 1532(20); 1533(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (providing requirements for
listing species as threatened).
13
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affecting its continued existence.”80  Importantly, the listing deter-
mination must be made “solely on the basis of the best scientific
and commercial data available” after a species status review.81
C. Applying ESA’s Requirements
Plaintiffs bringing ESA claims frequently argue there is insuffi-
cient evidence of the connection between habitat loss and the spe-
cies’ likelihood of survival.82  In Defenders of Wildlife v. Norton,83 the
Ninth Circuit addressed this issue.84  In that case, the court held
that evidence of habitat loss alone was insufficient to qualify a spe-
cies for listing.85  While agencies have a “wide degree of discretion,”
the court explained this discretion does not preempt the require-
ment that the agency sufficiently explain its actions.86
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue recently
in the landmark case In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing
and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation (In re Polar Bear).87  The court upheld
the polar bear listing at issue in that case, distinguishing it from
Defenders of Wildlife.88  Unlike the notice in Defenders of Wildlife, the
D.C. Circuit found the polar bear listing “provide[d] ‘a discernible
path’” and “firmly ‘articulate[d] a rational connection between the
facts found and the choices made.’”89
80. See id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)-(E) (outlining factors for determining whether
species is endangered or threatened).  Likelihood of endangerment may be based
on any one factor, or a combination of factors. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d 671, 684
(9th Cir. 2016) (discussing ESA requirement).
81. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (requiring determination be based on best
available science).
82. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 682 (stating next claim).
83. 258 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2001).
84. See Def. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001) (consid-
ering quantitative approach to listing determinations).
85. See id. (rejecting proposed “predetermined percentage” definition).
86. See id. at 1145 (finding agency action arbitrary and capricious).  The court
noted the agency’s failure to explain its conclusion not only prevented them from
adhering to the deferential standard of review, but was also a sufficient basis for
reversing the agency’s action. See id. at 1145-46 (first citing Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 616
F.2d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1980); and then citing People of State of Cal. v. FCC, 39
F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 1994)) (explaining impact of failing to explain actions).
87. In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (considering adequacy of
agency’s explanation).
88. See id. at 10 (distinguishing from Def. of Wildlife).
89. See id. at 10 (first quoting Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d
227, 241 (D.C. Cir. 2008); and then quoting Keating v. FERC, 569 F.3d 427, 433
(D.C. Cir. 2009)) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim).  The court found the agency “con-
sidered and explained how the loss of sea ice harms the polar bear,” and observed
trends of areas with the most significant habitat loss. Id. at 9 (finding for agency).
14
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While the statute’s text and legislative history provide guidance
on most of the terms, Congress left other terms undefined.90  When
the agency’s interpretation of these terms are challenged, a review-
ing court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory pro-
vision for a reasonable interpretation . . . of an agency,” but may
“impose its own construction . . . in the absence of an administra-
tive interpretation.”91  The undefined terms addressed by the Ninth
Circuit in Pritzker include “best scientific and commercial data avail-
able,” “foreseeable future,” and “likely.”92
1. “Best-Available Science”
Section 4 of the ESA requires listing determinations be made
based solely on “the best scientific and commercial data availa-
ble.”93  What constitutes “best-available science,” however, has been
left to the courts to decide.94  Judicial review of this requirement is
highly deferential, as this determination belongs to an agency’s
“special expertise.”95  As a result, the court will uphold an agency’s
scientific determinations so long as the agency “provides a reasona-
ble explanation for adopting its approach and discloses the limita-
tions of that approach.”96
As a general matter, the court upheld the use of climate
change factors as the “best available science” in Alaska Oil & Gas
90. See, e.g., In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 14 (noting “likely” undefined by Act or
regulation); see also Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136,
1141 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding “distinct population segment” undefined).
91. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(explaining whose interpretation prevails under Chevron).  For a further discussion
on Chevron, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
92. For a discussion on these terms, see infra notes 93-123 and accompanying
text.
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (stating basis for making determinations).  For
a further discussion on listing determination requirements, see supra notes 78-81
and accompanying text.
94. See Claire M. Horan, Case Comment, Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell (D. Mont.
2016), 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 302-03 (2017) (discussing “best available sci-
ence” requirement).  Congress added the “best scientific and commercial data
available” language in 1982, intending to reduce deliberation time, but did not
define the phrase anywhere. See id. (noting oversight by Congress).  The legislative
history also provides minimal insight into Congress’s intended meaning. See id.
(discussing lack of direction from Congress).
95. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 602
(9th Cir. 2014) (explaining best science requirement).  When reviewing scientific
decisions, “a reviewing court must generally be at its most deferential.” Id. (quot-
ing Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983)) (directing courts
to be deferential).  Importantly, “best available” does not mean “best possible.” Id.
(clarifying meaning).
96. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 679 (discussing deference owed in determining
“best available science”).
15
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Association v. Jewell.97  Relying on In re Polar Bear, the Ninth Circuit
in Jewell rejected plaintiffs’ claim that “future climate change is not
an appropriate consideration under the ESA” and held FWS prop-
erly considered climate change in designating critical habitat.98
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court’s requirement that
FWS prove current polar bear use of the designated units through
accurate scientific data as “directly counter to the Act’s conserva-
tion purposes.”99  Explaining the Act’s goal is to protect the species’
future, and that the Act does not require perfection, only the best
science available, the court upheld FWS’s approach in designating
critical habitat.100
The Ninth Circuit considered FWS’s scientific determinations
in Northwest Ecosystem Alliance v. United States Fish & Wildlife Ser-
vices.101  There, the plaintiff challenged FWS’s interpretation of a
peer review study, arguing the study’s finding of unique haplotypes
rendered the Washington squirrel population “markedly” differ-
ent.102  FWS concluded the Washington population was not “mark-
edly” different because the genetic differences were
“counterbalanced” by the lack of private alleles, the close relation
to Oregon haplotypes, and the reduced genetic diversity of the
97. Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 558 (9th Cir. 2016) (ap-
proving consideration of climate change factors in designating critical habitat).
98. Jewell, 815 F.3d at 558-60 (adopting D.C. Circuit’s holding).  “The very
climatic factors that Plaintiffs now criticize are those that the D.C. Circuit took into
account in approving the listing of polar bears as threatened.” Id. at 558 (citing In
re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d 1, 4-6 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (finding plaintiffs’ arguments moot).
In In re Polar Bear, the D.C. Circuit upheld the listing of polar bears as threatened
under the ESA.  709 F.3d at 9 (upholding threatened species listing).  In reaching
this conclusion, the court considered FWS’s use of climate change studies and re-
ports. See id. at 4-6 (explaining background for FWS’s listing decision).
99. See Jewell, 815 F.3d at 555 (agreeing with FWS).  FWS designated three
areas for critical habitat after determining they contained primary constituent ele-
ments (PCEs) essential to polar bear conservation. See id. (providing background).
The three areas FWS identified were sea ice habitat, terrestrial denning habitat,
and barrier island habitat. See id. (noting areas designated).  In requiring a height-
ened standard of specificity, the district court suggested that only those areas actu-
ally used for denning could be designated, as opposed to those areas suitable for
denning. Id. (rejecting strict interpretation).
100. See id. at 555-56 (citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell,
747 F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014)) (explaining ESA requirements).  The court
stated the proper focus is not the current existence of the species, but rather the
primary constituent elements required for species’ preservation. See id. at 556
(clarifying proper focus).
101. 475 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007).
102. Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1149-50
(9th Cir. 2007) (considering third factor challenged by plaintiff).
16
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Washington populations.103  Explaining that FWS “articulated rea-
soned connections between the record and its conclusion,” the
court rejected the plaintiff’s claim and deferred to the agency’s in-
terpretation of “complex scientific data.”104
The D.C. Circuit also considered the science used by FWS in
the In re Polar Bear case.105  There, the court explained that courts
generally “defer to agency modeling of complex phenomena.”106
The court further noted a model’s limits and imperfections are not
a sufficient basis for overruling agency decisions, so long as the
agency justifies its use of the models.107  Finding that FWS acknowl-
edged the limitations of the models used, and that the models were
used for a limited purpose, the court upheld the agency’s narrow
reliance on the United States Geological Survey (USGS) models.108
2. “Foreseeable Future”
To list a species as threatened, NMFS must conclude the spe-
cies is likely to become endangered within the “foreseeable fu-
ture.”109  Congress neglected to define the term “foreseeable
future” and legislative history provides little insight into this
phrase.110  Several federal courts have upheld agency interpreta-
103. See id. (explaining FWS’s findings).  FWS also noted the study results may
have been impacted by such factors as inbreeding and small sample size. See id. at
1150 (considering FWS’s reasoning).
104. See id. at 1150 (upholding FWS’s denial of petition).  The court con-
cluded FWS’s genetic analysis was neither arbitrary nor capricious and upheld the
agency’s denial of the petition. Id. (finding for agency).
105. 709 F.3d 1, 12-13 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (turning to plaintiffs’ third claim).
106. Id. at 13 (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1053-54
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam)) (explaining deferential standard).
107. See id. (quoting Appalachian Power Co., 249 F.3d at 1052) (rejecting im-
perfection as basis for remanding agency decisions).
108. See id. at 13-14 (finding FWS’s reliance neither arbitrary nor capricious).
FWS explained its methodology in using the models in the Listing Rule and pub-
lished the full Amstrup Report prior to publishing the final rule. See id. at 13
(citing Determination of Threatened Status for the Polar Bear (Ursus maritimus)
Throughout Its Range, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,272-75, 28,235 (May 15, 2008))
(considering FWS’s reasoning).  Further, the Listing Rule repeatedly stated FWS
only used the models to “confir[m] ‘the general direction and magnitude’ of the
population trends” forecast by other evidence. Id. (quoting Determination of
Threatened Status, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,276) (providing support for conclusion).
109. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened species”).  For a further
discussion on listing determination requirements, see supra notes 78-81 and ac-
companying text.
110. See OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, M-37021,
Memorandum on the Meaning of “Foreseeable Future” in Section 3(20) of the
Endangered Species Act 12 (Jan. 16, 2009), https://www.doi.gov/solicitor/opin
ions [hereinafter Solicitor’s Memo] (providing guidance for “foreseeable future”
determinations).  Beginning with the bearded seal petition, NMFS adopted this
approach. See Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 76,740, 76,753 (Dec. 28, 2012) (to be codi-
17
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tions of this factor as “based upon the best data available for a par-
ticular species and its habitat.”111  For example, In re Polar Bear
rejected a preference for a different time frame as irrelevant.112
The D.C. Circuit found FWS’s determination “justifiabl[y] and
clearly articulated” the polar bear’s primary habitat because it was
based on reliable projections of sea ice loss.113
To address this gap, the Department of the Interior provided
internal guidance on making the “foreseeable future” determina-
tion in 2009.114  The Solicitor General explained in this memoran-
dum that “foreseeable future” determinations are to be made on a
case-by-case basis, using the best data available.115  The Solicitor ex-
fied at 50 C.F.R. pt. 223) (noting new approach consistent with Solicitor General’s
guidance).  For further discussion on NMFS’s adoption of this approach, see supra
notes 26-28, 33-35 and accompanying text.
111. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d 671, 681 (first citing In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at
10-11, 15-16 (upholding NMFS’s determination of timeline based on threats to the
species, its habitat, and best available science); then citing W. Watersheds Project v.
Ashe, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180 (D. Idaho 2013) (holding agency interpretation
typically based on timeframes over which best science available can be reliably as-
sessed); and then citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lubchenco, 758 F. Supp. 2d
945, 967 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (noting “foreseeable future” determination varies by
species)) (considering view of other federal courts).
112. 709 F.3d at 15-16 (analyzing “foreseeability” challenge).  Appellants did
not challenge the models, data, or process used, but rather, claimed FWS did not
justify its determination for the forty-five-year time frame. See id. (clarifying appel-
lants’ claim).
113. See id. at 15-16 (considering FWS’s explanation).  Critical to the “foresee-
able future” determination is the timeframe for which available scientific data is
reliable in assessing the effect of threats to the species. See id. at 15 (citing Deter-
mination of Threatened Status, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,253) (explaining “foreseeable
future” approach).  Using “the most widely accepted climate models,” FWS found
there was general agreement about sea ice trends until around 2040-2050. See id.
at 15-16 (noting reliance on “best available” science).  The court found FWS did
not rely on factors which Congress did not intend it consider, overlook any impor-
tant aspects, or offer a contradictory explanation, nor was its explanation “so im-
plausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Id. (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (upholding
FWS’s finding).
114. See Solicitor’s Memo, supra note 110, at 1 (summarizing memorandum’s
purpose).  The Solicitor defined the “foreseeable future” as “the extent to which
the Secretary can reasonably rely on predictions about the future.” Id. (providing
definition).
115. See id. at 12-14 (stating conclusions).  In reaching this conclusion, the
Solicitor considered the phrase’s ordinary meaning and context, legislative history,
and general administrative law principles. Id. at 12 (looking to variety of sources
for phrase’s meaning).  The Solicitor explained that findings for each species
should be unique, based on an amalgam of information on the species, including
future population trends and threats, as well as the consequences of those trends
and threats. See id. at 13 (detailing case-specific approach).  The Solicitor only
found two cases directly addressing the meaning of this phrase and while they did
not discuss the issue in detail, they were “broadly consistent” with the Solicitor’s
analysis. Id. at 10-11 (first citing Oregon Nat. Res. Council v. Daley, 6 F. Supp. 2d
18
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pressly declined to adopt a uniform timeframe, but explained the
foreseeable future should “extend[ ] only so far as those predic-
tions are reliable.”116  The Solicitor’s conclusion also stressed the
agency “articulate a reasoned explanation as to why reliable predic-
tions can be made, and to the extent that the Secretary quantifies
the foreseeable future, a basis for that particular point in the future
versus others.”117
3. “Likely”
To list a species as threatened, NMFS must also find the species
is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future.118
Similar to “foreseeable future,” the phrase “likely to become endan-
gered” was left undefined by Congress.119  In Defenders of Wildlife v.
Norton, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected a quantitative approach
proposed by the plaintiffs, explaining that if a “bright line percent-
age” were appropriate, Congress could have included that percent-
age in the statute’s text.120  Similarly, the D.C. Circuit refused to
impose a quantitative definition and upheld FWS’s interpretation
in In re Polar Bear.121  Applying the “fundamental canon of statutory
construction” that undefined terms are interpreted as having their
1139 (D. Or. 1998); and then citing Western Watersheds Project v. Foss, 2005 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 45753 (D. Idaho Aug. 19, 2005)) (discussing case law).
116. Id. at 13 (stating conclusions).  The Solicitor explained that “Congress
purposefully did not set a uniform time frame . . . nor did Congress intend that the
Secretary set a uniform time frame.” Id. (refusing to set standard time frame).
Data must “provide a reasonable degree of confidence,” though it need not be
certain. Id. (rejecting certainty as ESA requirement).
117. Id. at 16 (stressing APA requirements).  For a further discussion on the
APA standard, see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
118. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (defining “threatened species”).  For a further
discussion on listing determination requirements, see supra notes 78-81 and ac-
companying text.
119. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d 671, 684 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding Congress silent
on term’s meaning).
120. See Def. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1143-44 (9th Cir. 2001)
(explaining problems with proposed quantitative approach); accord Solicitor’s
Memo, supra note 110, at 13 (explaining Congress did not set uniform timeframe).
The court in Def. of Wildlife further noted it was unreasonable “to assume that the
loss of a predetermined percentage” should automatically “qualify a species for
listing,” and stated a case-by-case approach was preferred. See Def. of Wildlife, 258
F.3d at 1143 (stating preference for case-by-case approach).
121. See In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d 1, 15-16 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding interpreta-
tion consistent with word’s ordinary meaning).  Appellants claimed FWS had
adopted the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) definition of
“likely” when it referenced the definition in response to a peer review question.
See id. at 14 (stating appellants’ claim).  Reading the section in context, the court
concluded the reference concerned “the agency’s confidence in the climate fore-
casts,” not its prediction of polar bear survival. See id. at 14-15 (rejecting appel-
lants’ argument).
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common meaning, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the
agency intended any other meaning of the term.122  The court fur-
ther explained that agencies are free to rely on common English
usage in rulemaking and are not required to adopt “specialized
definitions.”123
IV. PREDICTIVE REASONING: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS
IN PRITZKER
The Ninth Circuit deferred heavily to NMFS in conducting its
de novo review to determine whether the listing decision was “arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accor-
dance with law.”124  Before diving into the facts leading to NMFS’s
determination, the court briefly explained the APA’s “deferential
and narrow” standard of review.125  Stressing the deference af-
forded the agency throughout the opinion, the court upheld the
listing decision as neither arbitrary nor capricious.126
A. Climate Change Models as “Best Available Science”
As an initial matter, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to
undermine the use of climate change models.127  Relying on its re-
cent decision in Alaska Oil & Gas Association v. Jewell, the court
called the argument “unavailing.”128  Turning to NMFS’s use of cli-
122. See id. at 15 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979))
(considering FWS’s interpretation).
123. See id. (upholding FWS’s interpretation).  Appellants were unable to cite
a single case in which an ESA listing decision was vacated because the agency failed
to specially define “likely,” and the court did not find the lack of a specific defini-
tion impeded its ability to review the decision. See id. (explaining conclusion).
124. Pritzker II, 840 F.3d 671, 675 (9th Cir. 2016) (first quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2); and then quoting Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 554 (9th
Cir. 2016)) (stating applicable standard of review).
125. See id. at 675-76 (explaining standard of review).  For a discussion on the
APA standard of review, see supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
126. See id. at 685 (finding listing decision reasonable).
127. See id. at 679 (considering plaintiffs’ first challenge).  Plaintiffs specifi-
cally claimed NMFS relied on climate models which can predict neither the de-
gree, nor the effects, of climate change beyond 2050. See id. (stating plaintiffs’
claim).  The court, however, stated that while plaintiffs challenged “long-term cli-
mate projections, they [sought] to undermine NMFS’s use of climate change pro-
jections as the basis for ESA listings.” See id. (calling argument “unavailing”).
128. See id. (citing Jewell, 815 F.3d at 558-59) (rejecting underlying claim).  In
Jewell, the court “adopted the D.C. Circuit’s holding that the IPCC climate models
constitute[ ] the ‘best available science’ and reasonably support[ ] the determina-
tion that a species reliant on sea ice likely would become endangered in the fore-
seeable future.” Id. (first citing Jewell, 815 F.3d at 558-59; and then citing In re Polar
Bear, 709 F.3d 1, 4-6, 9-11 (D.C. Cir. 2013)) (adopting D.C. Circuit holding).  For a
further discussion on Jewell’s adoption of In re Polar Bear, see supra notes 97-100 and
accompanying text.
20
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol29/iss2/6
2018] ALASKA OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION V. PRITZKER 329
mate models, the court conducted an extensive analysis of the evi-
dence supporting NMFS’s reliance on the projections.129  The
court explained listing decisions need not be based on “ironclad
and absolute” science.130  Instead, courts “ ‘must defer to the
agency’s interpretation of complex scientific data’ so long as the
agency provides a reasonable explanation for adopting its approach
and discloses the limitations of that approach.”131  The court de-
ferred to NMFS and upheld its determination after finding the
agency both acknowledged the volatility of the IPCC models and
explained how it accounted for the models’ “less reliable predictive
value” in the proposed rule.132
B. The Listing Decision
Having found NMFS reasonable in relying on the IPCC climate
change projections, the Ninth Circuit turned to the agency’s listing
decision.133  The plaintiffs asserted three principal arguments in
challenging NMFS’s decision to list the bearded seals as threatened:
(1) NMFS departed from its standard “foreseeable future” analysis;
(2) NMFS did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a nexus
between habitat loss and survival of the bearded seal; and (3) NMFS
failed to demonstrate that the Beringia DPS was likely to become
endangered in the foreseeable future.134  In rejecting these argu-
ments, the court also took issue with the district court’s attempt to
impose higher standards than the ESA requires.135
129. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 679-81 (analyzing NMFS’s reliance on IPCC
models).
130. See id. at 680 (citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747
F.3d 581, 602 (9th Cir. 2014)) (discussing value of volatile projections).
131. See id. at 679-80 (quoting Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,
475 F.3d 1136, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007)) (citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth.,
747 F.3d at 602) (discussing requirements of ESA and deferential standard).
132. See id. at 678-81 (upholding NMFS’s conclusion).  NMFS focused its anal-
ysis on the impact of warmer temperatures on the Beringia DPS “[b]ecause CBD’s
petition cited global warming as the primary threat to bearded seals.” Id. at 678
(providing background).  While IPCC’s models through 2050 were based on pre-
sent-day emissions data, the models for 2050-2100 involved unknown factors, such
as “technological improvement, [and] changes in climate policy.” Id. (explaining
concerns presented by models).  NMFS accounted for this uncertainty by compar-
ing projections to observational data to determine the models’ reliability. See id.
(discussing NMFS’s validation process).  For a further discussion on the proposed
rule, see supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
133. See id. at 681 (introducing listing decision challenge).
134. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 681-84 (addressing plaintiffs’ arguments).
135. For a further discussion on the Ninth Circuit’s issues with the district
court’s holding, see infra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
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1. “Foreseeable Future”
Agreeing with plaintiffs that NMFS deviated from its standard
“foreseeable future” interpretation, the Ninth Circuit considered
the agency’s new approach.136  The court, applying the deferential
Skidmore standard of review, explained the “agency must provide a
reasoned explanation for adoption of its new policy—including an
acknowledgement that it is changing its position and if appropriate,
any new factual findings that may inform that change.”137  Because
the Solicitor General’s memorandum thoroughly explained the
reasons for adopting a “threat-specific” approach, and NMFS ac-
knowledged the change in approach for the bearded seal species,
the court concluded NMFS’s adoption of the new approach was
neither arbitrary nor capricious.138
2. Rational Connection
The court then turned to NMFS’s reasoning for listing the Ber-
ingia DPS as threatened.139  The Ninth Circuit first rejected the dis-
trict court’s conclusion, explaining the court’s request for “a
predicted ‘population reduction,’ ‘extinction threshold,’ or
‘probability of reaching that threshold’” was “at odds with the
ESA.”140  Relying on Jewell, the court rejected narrow constructions
136. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 681 (considering plaintiffs’ first argument).
NMFS argued the “foreseeable future” determination is made for each particular
species, based on its habitat and the best available science. See id. at 681 (stating
agency argument).  For a discussion on the “foreseeable future” determination,
see supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
137. See id. at 681-82 (citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,
513-15 (2009)) (explaining applicable standard of review).  “An internal guidance
document that reflects an agency’s ‘body of experience and informed judgment,’
but that is not promulgated through rulemaking, is typically afforded Skidmore def-
erence.” Id. (first citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399
(2008); and then citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-32 (2001))
(finding Skidmore applicable).  For a further discussion on Fox Television Stations,
see supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion on Fed.
Express Corp., see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.  For a further discus-
sion on Mead, see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
138. See id. at 682 (first citing Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. at 76,753; and then
citing Solicitor’s Memo, supra note 110, at 4, 8-9) (considering explanation for new
approach).  For a discussion of NMFS’s acknowledgement in the final rule, see
supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.  For a discussion on the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s internal memorandum, see supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
139. See id. at 682-83 (proceeding to plaintiffs’ second claim).  Plaintiffs
claimed NMFS put forth insufficient evidence to prove the loss of sea ice placed
the bearded seal at risk for extinction. See id. (stating second claim).
140. See id. at 683 (quoting Pritzker I, No. 4:13-cv-18-RRB, 2014 WL 3726121, at
*15 (D. Alaska July 25, 2014)) (rejecting district court’s conclusion).  The district
court concluded NMFS had “no reasonable basis for listing the Beringia DPS” be-
cause it was unable to provide these predictions. Id. (discussing district court con-
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of the ESA because requiring “highly specific information for which
data simply [does] not exist” inhibits the Act’s ability to achieve its
goal of protecting species’ futures.141  Turning to the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument, the court relied on In re Polar Bear to distinguish the Ber-
ingia DPS rule from the flat-tailed horned lizard rule at issue in
Defenders of Wildlife.142  While Defenders of Wildlife held that evidence
of habitat loss alone is an insufficient basis for listing a species as
threatened, NMFS “drew upon existing research to explain how
habitat loss would likely endanger the bearded seal,” which ade-
quately supports listing a species.143  Finding NMFS manifested its
consideration of the relevant factors “and articulated a rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choices made,” the court
upheld the explanation as adequate.144
3. Likelihood of Endangerment
The Ninth Circuit turned to plaintiffs’ third and final claim,
that NMFS was required to prove that the magnitude of climate
change impacts would render the Beringia DPS threatened by the
end of the century.145  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ interpreta-
tion of the ESA’s “likelihood” requirement as inaccurate and held
the district court erred in requiring “specific quantitative
clusion).  The Ninth Circuit explained this “request for unobtainable, highly
specified data would require NMFS to wait until it had quantitative data reflecting
a species’ decline, its population tipping point, and the exact year in which that
tipping point would occur before it could adopt conservation policies to prevent
that species’ decline.” Id. (rejecting district court’s conclusion).
141. Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 683 (quoting Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815
F.3d 544, 555 (9th Cir. 2016)) (supporting rejection of district court’s approach).
“[N]arrow construction . . . runs directly counter to the Act’s conservation pur-
poses.” Id. (quoting Jewell, 815 F.3d at 555) (explaining ESA’s objectives).  For a
further discussion on Jewell, see supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
142. See id. at 683 (citing In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 2013))
(considering plaintiffs’ argument).  Plaintiffs argued NMFS should have adopted a
“wait and see” approach for the bearded seal. Id. (stating plaintiffs’ claim).  For a
discussion on In re Polar Bear, see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
143. See id. at 683 (first citing Def. of Wildlife v. Norton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1143
(9th Cir. 2001); and then citing In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 9-10) (distinguishing
bearded seal listing).  For a discussion on Def. of Wildlife, see supra notes 83-86 and
accompanying text.
144. See id. at 683-84 (quoting Nw. Ecosystem All., 475 F.3d at 1140) (upholding
NMFS’s explanation).
145. See id. at 684 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20)) (concluding plaintiffs misin-
terpreted ESA).  Specifically, plaintiffs said NMFS needed to prove climate
change’s impact would “place[ ]the species ‘in danger of extinction’ by the year
2100.” Id. (stating plaintiffs’ contention).  For a further discussion of the ESA
“likelihood” requirement, see supra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
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targets.”146  Explaining that the ESA does not require this determi-
nation be based on quantified losses, risk magnitudes, or extinction
thresholds, the court upheld NMFS’s “common meaning” interpre-
tation of “likely.”147
The Ninth Circuit, therefore, concluded that NMFS thor-
oughly assessed the “best available scientific and commercial data,”
and considered public comments prior to listing the Beringia DPS
as threatened.148  Further, in reaching its decision, NMFS “com-
plied with the letter and spirit of the ESA,” and provided multiple
opportunities for public contribution.149  Because there was ample
evidence to support NMFS’s decision to list the Beringia DPS as
threatened, the court concluded the final rule was neither arbitrary
nor capricious.150
V. EXPLANATION OR PREDICTION: ANALYZING THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S
REASONING IN PRITZKER
In light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Jewell just months ear-
lier, its reversal of the district court in Pritzker was predictable.151
Although consistent overall, the court’s analysis presents some im-
146. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 684 (rejecting plaintiffs’ third claim and district
court’s holding).  The district court held NMFS was required to demonstrate “‘pre-
dicted population reduction,’ define an ‘extinction threshold,’ and provide infor-
mation on the ‘probability of reaching that threshold within a specified time.’” Id.
(stating district court’s holding).  The ESA, however, only requires an “agency de-
termine the likelihood of a species’ endangerment based on one or more [of the
five] statutory factors.” Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)) (explaining ESA re-
quirement).  For a discussion on the five statutory factors, see supra notes 79-80
and accompanying text.
147. See id. (first citing In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 14-15; and then citing Def.
of Wildlife, 258 F.3d at 1141-43) (agreeing with D.C. Circuit’s holding).  NMFS in-
terpreted the term as “more likely than not.” Id. (stating agency’s interpretation).
In reaching its conclusion, the court considered definitions found in the Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, Oxford English Dictionary, and Black’s Law Dictionary. See id.
(relying on lexicons).
148. See id. at 684-85 (explaining overall conclusion).  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the court acknowledged the data available on the bearded seal is limited. See
id. (acknowledging limits of data).
149. See id. (discussing NMFS’s approach).  For a further discussion on the
“notice and opportunity” provided to the public, see supra notes 33-35 and accom-
panying text.
150. See id. at 685 (upholding NMFS’s listing decision).
151. See Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 550 (9th Cir. 2016)
(finding agency’s critical habitat designation neither arbitrary nor capricious). Jew-
ell provided the basis for reversing many of the district court’s conclusions. See, e.g.,
Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 679 (noting Jewell’s adoption of IPCC climate models as “best
available science”); Id. at 680 (explaining plaintiffs’ demanded more than ESA
required); Id. at 683 (rejecting district court’s interpretation of ESA).
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portant considerations.152  While not detrimental to the court’s
holding, the opinion could have benefitted from a more thorough
framing of the highly deferential APA standard of review at the out-
set.153  Additionally, the court overlooked the Chevron doctrine in
considering some of NMFS’s interpretations.154  Finally, some of
the court’s statements concerning the Solicitor General’s memo-
randum raise questions.155
A. Agency Deference
The district court considered applicability of Chevron deference
at the outset, but the Ninth Circuit stated only the APA standard of
review before discussing the facts.156  While this approach is in line
with precedent, there were other opportunities at which the court
could have considered the Chevron framework, as other circuit
courts have.157  For example, the court could have applied Chevron
in considering NMFS’s interpretation of the term “likely,” as NMFS
promulgated the Listing Rule pursuant to its congressionally-dele-
gated rulemaking authority.158  The court found the phrase “likely
152. See, e.g., Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136,
1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding agency’s denial neither arbitrary nor capricious); In
re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (upholding polar bear listing).
153. Compare Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 675 (explaining de novo review), with Jewell,
815 F.3d at 554-55 (explaining standard of review).  In Jewell, the court provided a
lengthy and extensive explanation of the deferential APA standard, incorporating
the Supreme Court framework and internal circuit precedent. See Jewell, 815 F.3d
at 554-55 (first citing Ariz. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160, 1163
(9th Cir. 2010); then citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (State Farm), 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); then citing
River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2010);
and then citing Nw. Ecosystem All. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136,
1140 (9th Cir. 2007)) (explaining standard of review).
154. See, e.g., Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 684 (foregoing deference in considering
agency’s interpretation).  The court did apply Skidmore in considering the foresee-
able future interpretation, however. Id. at 681-82 (affording deference in analyz-
ing “foreseeable future” approach).  For a discussion on Chevron deference, see
supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
155. See id. at 682 (stating purpose of memorandum).
156. Compare Pritzker I, 2014 WL 3726121, at *2 (applying Chevron two step
test), with Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 675 (stating applicable standard of review).
157. See Jewell, 815 F.3d at 554 (explaining standard of review for ESA listings);
Nw. Ecosystem All., 475 F.3d at 1140 (recognizing agency listing decisions subject to
APA standard of review); see also In re Polar Bear, 709 F.3d at 8 (explaining ESA
listings subject to arbitrary and capricious review). But see Def. of Wildlife v. Nor-
ton, 258 F.3d 1136, 1145 n. 11 (noting Chevron not applicable); Nw. Ecosystem All.,
475 F.3d at 1141-43 (considering whether policy entitled to Chevron deference).
158. See Alanna Kearney, Note, The Battle May be Over, but What About the War?
Examining the ESA in the Crusade Against Global Warming After In re Polar Bear Endan-
gered Species Act Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 529, 561-
62 (2014) (explaining “likely” issue within Chevron’s ambit); cf. United States v.
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to become endangered” undefined by the ESA or regulation, an-
swering Chevron’s first step in the negative.159  Then, the court
would have considered whether NMFS’s interpretation was “a per-
missible construction of the statute” in light of Congress’s intent in
enacting the ESA.160  Affording Chevron deference would have al-
lowed the court to uphold the agency’s interpretation on the basis
of the Act’s goal and would have provided for a stronger conclu-
sion, instead of relying on dictionary definitions.161
Unlike other federal courts that have addressed the issue, the
Ninth Circuit found NMFS’s new policy interpreting “foreseeable
future” was entitled to Skidmore deference.162  The D.C. Circuit had
recently upheld the same case-by-case approach in In re Polar Bear,
but it did so under State Farm’s “deferential and narrow” stan-
dard.163  The court could have relied on the D.C. Circuit’s holding,
but instead conducted its own more thorough analysis and afforded
NMFS additional deference.164  The support provided by Skidmore is
possibly the reason that this case has been hailed a win for climate
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231 (2001) (finding Customs ruling letter ineligible for
Chevron deference).  The Court explained that classification rulings “present a case
far removed not only from notice-and-comment process, but from any other cir-
cumstances reasonably suggesting” Chevron deference was owed. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. at 231 (refusing to afford Chevron deference).  For a further discussion on
Mead Corp., see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
159. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 684 (finding “likely” undefined by statute);
Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (explaining
first step under Chevron).  For a further discussion on Chevron, see supra notes 60-64
and accompanying text.
160. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (explaining second prong of test).  Instead, the
Ninth Circuit looked to dictionary definitions of the term. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d
at 684 (upholding “common meaning” interpretation).  For a further discussion
on Chevron, see supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
161. Cf. Kearney, supra note 158, at 562-63 (noting court’s failure to address
overarching issue by avoiding Chevron).
162. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 681-82 (finding Skidmore deference applicable).
The court explained that “internal guidance document[s] that reflect[ ] an
agency’s ‘body of experience and informed judgment,’ but that [are] not promul-
gated through rulemaking, [are] typically afforded Skidmore deference.” Id. (first
citing Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008); then citing
Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 488 (2004); and then
citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230-32 (2001)) (stating standard
of review).
163. See Kearney, supra note 158, at 562 (calling D.C. Circuit’s finding “prob-
lematic”).  Kearney argued that the D.C. Circuit should have applied Chevron in
reaching its conclusion on the “foreseeable future” issue. See id. (proposing better
rationale for conclusion).
164. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 681-82 (noting D.C. Circuit’s agreement with
NMFS’s interpretation).
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change, specifically as it pertains to the foreseeable future
analysis.165
In light of Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, the court’s conclu-
sion that the policy was entitled to Skidmore deference was appropri-
ate, even absent the Chevron analysis.166  The court’s application of
this deferential standard, however, overlooked some of the determi-
nations required by Skidmore.167  Specifically, the court did not de-
termine what “measure of respect” the policy was entitled to under
Mead Corp. and Federal Express Corp..168  Upholding the change in
policy on grounds that the change was “well-reasoned,” the court’s
analysis instead looked like State Farm’s “satisfactory explanation.”169
B. The Solicitor General’s Guidance
Two of the court’s statements concerning the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s internal guidance appear to misconstrue statements con-
tained in the memorandum.170  First, the Solicitor General did not
expressly acknowledge that its interpretation represented a change
in agency policy.171  Rather, the Solicitor General recognized that
its guidance was a new policy altogether.172  This misstatement did
not impact the court’s conclusion, however, as the Solicitor General
“provide[d] a thorough and reasoned explanation” in support of
the new approach, as required by State Farm and Fox Television
Stations.173
The Ninth Circuit’s statement regarding the purpose of the So-
licitor General’s guidance is more concerning, even under the def-
165. See Lake & Petersen, supra note 11, at 10,217, 10,219 (discussing impacts
of Pritzker).
166. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (assuming
internal agency interpretations not entitled to Chevron).  For a further discussion
on Fed. Express Corp., see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
167. For a discussion on Skidmore, see supra notes 57-59 and accompanying
text.
168. For a discussion of Mead Corp., see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text.  For a discussion of Fed. Express Corp., see supra notes 70-72 and accompanying
text.
169. See Kearney, supra note 158, at 562 (disagreeing with D.C. Circuit’s appli-
cation of State Farm in foreseeability analysis).
170. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 682 (addressing internal policy on foreseeable
future).
171. Contra id. (stating solicitor acknowledged change in policy).
172. See Solicitor’s Memo, supra note 110, at 4 (acknowledging previous lack
of guidance).
173. See Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 682 (finding Solicitor General’s explanation
thorough).  For a discussion on State Farm, see supra notes 50-52 and accompany-
ing text.  For a discussion on Fox Television Stations, see supra notes 53-56 and ac-
companying text.
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erential and narrow standard of review.174  Contrary to the opinion,
the Solicitor General does not expressly state that the reason for the
new approach is to conform with federal appellate decisions.175  In-
stead, the Solicitor General merely referenced the cases as support-
ing the conclusion that listing determinations are not to be
speculative.176  Further, the “Guidance” section of the memoran-
dum clarifies that the Solicitor General sought to conform “with the
ordinary meaning of the term ‘foreseeable’ and the context in
which it is used in the ESA.”177  As State Farm only requires “a satis-
factory explanation for [agency] action including a ‘rational con-
nection between the facts found and the choice made,’” a more
precise articulation of the Solicitor General’s intent would not have
changed the outcome of the case, so it is unclear why the court
chose to state the purpose this way.178
VI. THE UNPREDICTABLE: IMPACTS OF PRITZKER
By upholding the Beringia DPS listing in Pritzker, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that species not presently endangered can be listed
under the ESA due to the threats of climate change.179  If other
courts follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead, the future could see an up-
tick in threatened species listings.180  Some commentators argue
the impacts of climate change models are limited to Arctic species,
but others argue the use of long-term climate change projections
combined with a near-unlimited foreseeable future timeframe
could result in unnecessary threatened species listings.181  To avoid
misuse of the ESA’s protections, agencies must make listing deter-
174. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (prohibiting courts from providing reason on agency’s behalf).  For
a further discussion on the State Farm framework, see supra notes 50-52 and accom-
panying text.
175. Compare Solicitor’s Memo, supra note 110, at 8-9 (supporting rejection of
speculation with examples), with Pritzker II, 840 F.3d at 682 (stating Solicitor Gen-
eral’s intent to conform to federal judicial standards).
176. See Solicitor’s Memo, supra note 110, at 8-9 (rejecting speculative basis
for listing decisions).  The Solicitor General explained these cases merely “pro-
vide[ded] important context for interpreting ‘foreseeable future.’” Id. at 9 (sup-
porting conclusion).
177. Id. at 12 (recognizing discretionary limits).
178. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining APA standard).
179. For a further discussion of the issue addressed by the Ninth Circuit, see
supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
180. See Lake & Petersen, supra note 11, at 10,217, 10,219 (discussing impacts
of Pritzker).
181. See id. (comparing impacts of broad and narrow readings); Horan, supra
note 94, at 317 (explaining climate change’s direct negative impacts harder to
show for most species).
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minations case-by-case, based on threats to the specific species
under review.182  Agencies should also consider limiting the use of
long term projections to Arctic regions where the impacts of cli-
mate change are more severe.183
Although the plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari was denied by
the Supreme Court on January 22, 2018, Pritzker still faces other
challenges.184  Pursuant to President Trump’s “Enforcing the Regu-
latory Reform Agenda” Executive Order, all agencies are required
to establish Regulatory Reform Task Forces to “evaluate existing
regulations [ ] and make recommendations” for “repeal, replace-
ment, [and] modification.”185  These reviews could impact the So-
licitor General’s guidance on the foreseeable future or the Listing
Rule itself.186  The legislative branch could also limit Pritzker’s im-
pact by amending the ESA or by amending the APA.187  Notably,
Congress has already introduced legislation to overrule the defer-
ential Chevron doctrine.188
Even if the Ninth Circuit’s holding stands, the fight is not yet
over for the Beringia DPS.189  Like the polar bear listing in In re
182. See Lake & Petersen, supra note 11, at 10,219 (limiting Pritzker’s
applicability).
183. See Petition to List, supra note 7, at 1 (explaining unique impact of climate
change on Arctic animals); see also Horan, supra note 94, at 317 (noting colder
regions more prone to climate change’s impacts).
184. Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Ross, No. 17-133, 2018 WL 491542, at *1 (U.S.
Jan. 22, 2018) (denying petition for certiorari).  The petition for certiorari was
filed July 21, 2017 and the administration filed a brief in opposition on November
27, 2017. See Docket for 17-133, SUPREME COURT, https://www.supremecourt.gov/
search.aspx?filename=/Docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-133.html (last visited
Jan. 25, 2018) (providing docket information).
185. Exec. Order No. 13,777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285, 12,285-86 (Feb. 24, 2017)
(announcing Regulatory Reform Task Forces).
186. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., supra note 14 (discussing purpose
of Regulatory Reform Task Forces).
187. See Lake & Petersen, supra note 11, at 10,219 (discussing legislative
challenges).
188. See id. (citing The Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016, H.R.
4768, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016)) (explaining proposed Act).  The Separation of
Powers Restoration Act would amend the APA to include a de novo review “to
render it as explicit as possible that courts, not agencies, must decide all questions
of law,” overturning Chevron. H.R. REP. NO. 114-622, at 2, 9 (2016) (explaining
proposed solution).  The Separation of Powers Restoration Act was introduced in
the Senate on July 18, 2017. See Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2017, S.
1577, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) (introducing bill to amend 5 U.S.C. § 706).
189. See Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Appeals Court Reinstates
Endangered Species Act Protections for Bearded Seals (Oct. 24, 2016), https://
www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/2016/bearded-seal-10-24-2016.
html (noting importance of Ninth Circuit’s decision).  According to CBD, bearded
seals “could be doomed to extinction” if they are not afforded the ESA’s protec-
tions. Id. (emphasizing bearded seals’ need for protection).
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Polar Bear, the Beringia DPS listing was extremely limited and could
be considered an “empty gesture.”190  NMFS still needs to designate
critical habitat for the Beringia DPS, which may result in additional
litigation.191  Legislative and regulatory changes may also impact
this determination, causing further delays in critical habitat desig-
nation.192  While Alaska Oil & Gas Association v. Pritzker has been
hailed a win for the bearded seal and climate change science, the
uncertain future of climate change laws and regulations could
prove detrimental to the ESA’s conservation goals.193
Shawna Riley*
190. See Kearney, supra note 158, at 565-66 (calling polar bear listing “empty
gesture”).
191. See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Jewell, 815 F.3d 544, 550 (9th Cir.
2016) (challenging critical polar bear habitat designations).  The polar bear
threatened species listing was upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 2013. See id. (provid-
ing context for case).  Then, after FWS approved critical habitat designations, sev-
eral parties brought suit challenging those designations. See id. (explaining
background).  The District Court of Alaska granted summary judgment in favor of
the challengers in 2013, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and upheld the designa-
tions in 2016. Id. (reversing district court).
192. For a discussion on potential legal and regulatory changes, see supra
notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
193. See Lake & Petersen, supra note 11, at 10,219 (noting uncertain future
for climate change); Davenport, supra note 3 (discussing Trump campaign’s plans
to rollback climate change policies); see also Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diver-
sity, supra note 189 (noting ESA protections require addressing climate change).
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
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